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CONSTRUCTIVE HAIKU AND THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS: Raintree County Memorial
Library Occasional Paper No. 3
Edited by Douglass G. Boshkofft
PREFACE
More than ten years ago, the legal community was awash with
speculation as to the identity of the author of two manuscripts, one which
came to light in 1991,1 followed by a second in 1996.2 Each contained
poems focusing on and illuminating various aspects of contract law. The
author's identity was never ascertained even though it appeared that (s)he
was a resident of Raintree County, a library user, and well versed in the
content of a traditional contract law course. Three library patrons were
suspected of being the author but none could be linked with the holographic
manuscripts.4 It was hoped that further clues might be found if another
manuscript surfaced, but none materialized. For a decade, the anonymous
poet was silent. Then, this manuscript appeared under dramatic
circumstances that, unfortunately, I am not at liberty to disclose. The
Library Trustees granted me access to this collection on the condition that
the circumstances surrounding the discovery remain confidential. I am
authorized, however, to confirm that handwriting analysis supports a
hypothesis of common authorship.
As for the poems themselves, the three line format has apparently been
inspired by the pattern in a 5/7/5 haiku.' But there most similarity ends.
Very few in this collection conform to that model. And the traditional
association with a season is often missing. Having said that, I should also
note that, in some of the poems, the evocation of mood is as subtle and
dramatic as any language in a more traditional work. The powerful imagery
t Robert H. McKinney Emeritus Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
1. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts, Raintree County
Memorial Library Occasional Paper No. 1, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1533 (1991).
2. Douglass G. Boshkoff, More Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts, Raintree
County Memorial Library Occasional Paper No. 2, 91 Nw. U.L. REV. 295 (1996).
3. Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 1533-34.
4. Id.
5. Actually, the 5/7/5 sequence is an English invention. WILLIAM J. HIGGINSON, THE
HAIKU HANDBOOK: HOW TO WRITE, SHARE, AND TEACH 100 (1985).
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in phrases such as "smile of restitution," "lengthening shadows of
sickness," and "trapped in the silence of paper" is undeniable. The pleasure
to be derived from these legal gems is great, even when they fail to conform
to poetic norms.
In editing these haiku, I have organized them by subject matter and
provided captions for the individual verses. Where the author's meaning is
unclear, I have suggested possible interpretations. The irregular spacing in
some entries conforms to the spacing in the original manuscript.
Finally, a few words about the term "constructive haiku." Lawyers are
accustomed to the use of phrases such as "constructive trust," "constructive
possession," and "constructive service." All of these phrases are convenient
legal fictions which help effect "an adjustment between new situations and
an existing conceptual structure."6 The relationship suggested by use of
these terms is, at the same time, both significant and remote. And so it is
with these poems which are simultaneously closely related to and far
removed from traditional haiku. As one great haiku master is said to have
observed, "distance both infinite and infinitesimal unites us for the
moment."7
Bloomington, Indiana
May 19, 2006
I. CONTRACT FORMATION
Restatement(Second) Section 458
on the Noble Span9
travelers seek a distant shore
many paths of disappointment 0
6. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 71 (1967).
7. Attributed to author.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (2001) (discussing an option contract
created by part performance or tender).
9. The Brooklyn Bridge is used as a common setting for classroom hypotheticals and
casebook discussion. See, e.g., THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 76-77 (4th ed. 2004).
10. The possibility of disappointment was present in the traditional unilateral contract
model. The offeror remained free to revoke the offer until the bargained-for performance was
completed. See I. Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE
L.J. 136 (1916).
136 [Ariz. St. L.J.
CONSTRUCTIVE HAIKU
Raffles v. Wichelhaus"
twins without peer
each one transporting cotton
ambiguously
Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 12
Mrs. Carlill's nostrum
a gentle puff of smoke
immortality beckons13
Petterson v. Pattberg4
behind the screen door 5
an inchoate contract
nothingness
Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co. 
16
reassurance in December
casually
February's regret
11. (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. Div.). A contract called for delivery of cotton "ex
'Peerless"' from Bombay. Id. Unknown to the parties, there were two ships named "Peerless."
Id. The buyer and seller had different vessels in mind. The court held that there was no
agreement. Id. at 376.
12. (1892) 1 Q.B. 256 (Eng. C.A.). The ever popular "Smoke Ball" decision. For an
excellent explanation of the circumstances surrounding this decision, see A.W.B. Simpson,
Quackery and Contract Law: The Case of the Carbolic Smoke Ball, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 345
(1985).
13. There are two ways to read the last phrase. (1) By putting her trust in this patent
medicine, Mrs. Carlill was risking a case of the flu which might prove fatal. (2) Fame is a type
of immortality. The decision was characterized as "a staple of law school curricula" and cited
extensively in Leonard v. Pepsico Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), afftd, 210
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Mrs. Carlill, in fact, lived for ninety-six years. See Simpson supra note
12, at 389.
14. 161 N.E. 428, 430 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that an offer for an unilateral contract can be
revoked prior to the completion of acceptance).
15. This is possibly an oblique humorous reference to one of the most famous early adult
videos. See BEHIND THE GREEN DOOR (Mitchell Bros. Film Group 1972).
16. 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907). Embry is a leading decision used to introduce
students to the objective theory of contract formation. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM
BURNETT HARVEY & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 323-29 (8th
ed. 2003).
39:0135]
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Lucy v. Zehmer'
Zehmer's lovely farm
lost in a barroom bargain
no laughing matter 8
II. CONSIDERATION
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon1 9
implied promises
sticky strands of commitment
Ben's web
20
Schnell v. Nell
21
nominal consideration
a clearly confusing
oxymoron
22
Hamer v. Sidway
23
hasty generosity
reconsidered
the same old Story
2 4
17. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
18. "If it be assumed, contrary to what we think the evidence shows, that Zehmer was
jesting about selling his farm to Lucy and that the transaction was intended by him to be a joke,
nevertheless the evidence shows that Lucy did not so understand it but considered it to be a
serious business transaction .... Id. at 521.
19. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
20. This case is one of Benjamin Cardozo's most famous, and respected, opinions.
21. 17 Ind. 29 (1861).
22. Genuine consideration is never nominal. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 71--
72 (3d ed. 1999) ("Restatement Second, requires an actual bargain, not merely a pretense of
bargain .... ").
23. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
24. The author seems to be suggesting that the uncle repeatedly repudiated his promises.
There is no support for this assertion.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
CONSTRUCTIVE HAIKU
Restatement(Second) Section 9025
Williston' s child
2 6
reliance triumphant
the tides of injustice recede
Batsakis v. Demotsis
27
unfairness in April
ignored
a Greek tragedy
28
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank29
the gift ungiven
a promise quickly inferred
constructive justice3 °
I1. POLICING THE BARGAIN
Krell v. Henry31
a summer flat
Pall Mall in view
lengthening shadows of sickness
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (2001) (discussing a promise reasonably
inducing action or forbearance).
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be
limited as justice requires.
Id.
26. Promissory estoppel made its debut in the original Restatement of Contracts. Samuel
Williston was Reporter for that project. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1932).
27. 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). This case is a casebook favorite used as an
example of judicial reluctance to examine the adequacy of consideration. See, e.g., JOHN D.
CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON
CONTRACTS 195 (4th ed. 2004).
28. Hardly. The imbalance in values exchanged was substantial, but far from a tragic
occurrence.
29. 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927)
30. The anonymous poet appears to be critical of Cardozo's opinion in this case. This is,
indeed, a controversial decision. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOzO 335 (1998). Also, it appears
that the poet has had a change of mind. Cf Boshkoff, supra note 2, at 296.
31. (1903) 2 K.B. 740 (Eng. C.A.).
39:0135]
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Taylor v. Caldwel3 2
in Surrey Gardens
flames of misfortune
extinguished by wisdom
Sherwood v. Walker
33
herd34 in King's Cattle Yard
"pass the ketsup
hold the mustard" 3
5
Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Distric3 6
Odorizzi's fate
relentless waters of oppression
at flood stage 37
IV. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Restatement (Second) Section 213(2)38
promises past
trapped in the silence of paper
lost voices
Restatement(Second) Section 37539
formality's face
the smile of restitution
ever present
32. (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.).
33. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
34. As in the original manuscript. Possibly a misspelling of "heard."
35. A cow was sold for five-and-one-half cents per pound, strongly suggesting that she
was purchased for her value as hamburger. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 920.
36. 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
37. The imagery here seems to be directly related to language in the opinion: "The
difficulty, of course, lies in determining when the forces of persuasion have overflowed their
normal banks and become oppressive flood waters." Id. at 541.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(2) (2001) (discussing the effect of an
integrated agreement on prior agreements (more commonly known as the parole evidence rule)).
39. Id. § 375 (discussing restitution when a contract is within the statute of frauds). "A
party who would otherwise have a claim in restitution under a contract is not barred from
restitution for the reason that the contract is unenforceable by him because of the Statute of
Frauds unless the Statute provides otherwise or its purpose would be frustrated by allowing
restitution." Id.
140 [Ariz. St. L.J.
CONSTRUCTIVE HAIKU
V. RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
Lawrence v. Fox40
promissory strangers
new plaintiffs
pragmatically4'
VI. CONDITIONS
Gray v. Gardner42
The Lady Adams
Nantucket Roads before her
harbor of uncertainty4 3
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent'
Kent's demand
"perfect performance"
a real pipe dream
VII. REMEDIES
Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.45
Bloomer Girl no more
a new career awaits
constructive service
46
40. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
41. Lawrence was the seminal decision recognizing third party beneficiary enforcement
rights, more pragmatic in tone than doctrinal. See id. As Justice Gray observed, "if, therefore, it
could be shown that a more strict and technically accurate application of the rules applied,
would lead to a different result (which I by no means concede), the effort should not be made in
the face of manifest justice." Id. at 275.
42. 17 Mass. 188 (16 Tyng) (1821) (noting a form of condition used to allocate burden of
proof).
43. The time of her arrival in Nantucket Roads, uncertain, affected the contract price of a
cargo of whale oil. Id. at 188.
44. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
45. 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970).
46. At one time, a wrongfully discharged employee was not required to look for or accept
substitute employment. The employee was said to be in the "constructive service" of the
employer. II ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1095 (Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc., ed. 2002). Parker suggests a return to that view since the plaintiff was granted
39:0135]
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Hadley v. Baxendale47
missing in May
a legendary millshaft
Pickford's legacy
48
Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey
49
a punch never thrown
empty seats
sadness
Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co.50
a bridge to nowhere5
used by many52
crossed by few
Restatement (Second) Section 356(1)"3
penalty clauses
contractual terrorism
intractably
summary judgment on the issue of whether she reasonably rejected the defendant's offer of
substitute employment. Parker, 474 P.2d at 692-94. As the dissent noted,
It has never been the law that the mere existence of differences between two
jobs in the samefield is sufficient, as a matter of law, to excuse an employee
wrongfully discharged from one from accepting the other in order to
mitigate damages. Such an approach would effectively eliminate any
obligation of an employee to attempt to minimize damage arising from a
wrongful discharge. The only alternative job offer an employee would be
required to accept would be an offer of his former job by his former
employer.
Id. at 696.
47. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.)
48. Baxendale carried on business as "Pickford & Co." Id. at 146.
49. 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932) (describing how Jack Dempsey failed to honor his contract
for a prize fight promoted by the Chicago Coliseum Club). This case is often used to illustrate
the recovery of reliance damages. See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 16, at 89.
50. 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
51. A road was rerouted, making the bridge unnecessary. Id. at 307.
52. Many law professors and law students use this case when they discuss the mitigation
principle. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 266
(8th ed. 2006).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (2001) (discussing liquidated
damages and penalties).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Hawkins v. McGee5 4
a hairy hand
wisdom
beyond its grasp
5
Lumley v. Wagner56
a diva in default
specific performance refused
constructive freedom
57
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.
58
the Peevyhouse tract
protected by promise
sad landscape of loss
54. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
55. Hawkins is a good example of judicial unwillingness to protect the reliance interest.
56. (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.).
57. While the court was unwilling to grant specific performance, it did agree to restrain
Johanna Wagner from performing for a competitor. Id. at 693. In defense of this ruling, the
court observed:
It was objected that the operation of the injunction in the present case was
mischievous, excluding the Defendant J. Wagner from performing at any
other theatre while this Court had no power to compel her to perform at
Her Majesty's Theatre. It is true that I have not the means of compelling
her to sing, but she has no cause of complaint if I compel her to abstain
from the commission of an act which she had bound herself not to do, and
thus possibly cause her to fulfil [sic] her engagement .... [Tihe injunction
may also, as I have said, tend to the fulfilment [sic] of her engagement;
though, in continuing the injunction, I disclaim doing indirectly what I
cannot do directly.
Id. (emphasis added).
58. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
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